To summarize the conclusions of this rejoinder, I think Delandshere and Petrosky aimed at an important question, started the process of getting there, and then took a wrong turn. The important question is about how to represent complex teaching performance in different ways for different purposes. If assessment results are used for certification decisions, quantification poses no problem and indeed is an appropriate tool. If assessment results are used for describing good teaching and for advancing the field, description will also be required. But quantification is not the issue; the issue is one of matching information to purpose. The description contained in a score is not fine-grained enough for the purpose of improving teaching. It is incorrect to imply that judgments about certification, even if arrived at interpretivel~ and even if based on different evidence for different candidates or different tasks, would not be quantifiable. Such judgments would be at least pass-fail. Judges' perspectives are important, but no more so for writing descriptions well than for observing and rating performance assessment well. And in any case, the performance is meant to be representative of a class of performances, however narrowly defined, that fit the NBPTS Early Adolescence/ English Language Arts definitions of constructs related to good teaching.
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Educational Researcher, Vol. 28, No. 3, ~ n her response to our article (Delandshere & Petrosky, 1998) , Brookhart focuses mainly on two issues: (a) the possibility of quantification of complex performances, and (b) the distinction between construct-driven versus task-driven performance assessment. These are important concerns, and we will address her discussion of them, but they are not those that we posed in the original article.
The Possibility of Quantification
Generally speaking, we are not interested in answering the question of whether quantification is possible--anything can be quantified. Rather, we examine why scores or ratings are used in the assessment of complex performances and the meaning and usefulness they have, given the stated multiple purposes of the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) assessment. These questions about the meaning and usefulness of ratings are validity issues. Brookhart, however, does not seem to recognize this when she writes, "Had this article been about the meaning and usefulness of scores for intended purposes, I think its contribution would have been greater." Brookhart attempts to make a clear distinction between issues of quantification and validity, yet she sidesteps the points we make about the lack of definitional clarity; the relationship between measurement, assessment, and validity; and the general confusion in the field on these issues. Our entire article is about validity, and we do not see how Brookhart can claim otherwise. And, although our argument stems from a concern over the purpose and impact of the assessment, it purpose-GINETTE DELANDSHERE is an associate professor at the School of Education, Indiana University, 201 N. Rose Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405-1006 fully was not about designing a plan to collect evidence of consequence of the assessment, as Brookhart suggests that we might or should have done.
The way in which Brookhart deals with quantification is actually quite puzzling. She insists that quantification of complex performances is possible a point on which we do not disagree--but she never explains why it is necessary; what the ratings mean given that they mask complex interpretations; or how they are used. She states, for example, that a numerical decision is implied by certification when she writes that: "Assessment for certification necessarily implies a need for information that can be symbolized numerically, at least and most simply on a 1-0 (pass/certify--fail/do not certify) scale." While we agree that certification requires a decision, and that decisions are made based on information, it is unclear to us why this information or the decision drawn from it would have to be "symbolized numerically." Brookhart's argument here does not support the necessity of quantification; it simply recognizes that quantification is possible. Further it seems to us that the pass/fail (or 1-0) decision is a weak example of quantification and certainly does not establish its necessity. In the process of defending quantification, Brookhart claims that we implicitly answer negatively to the possibility of assigning numbers to complex performances. We agree that it is possible to assign numbers to performances, but that is not our concern. The more important issue, we think, concerns the meaning of these numbers. Brookhart, however, does not respond to this issue.
On a related matter, Brookhart questions the notions of "objectivity" and "correctness" that are implied in the use of ratings as we have argued in previous writing (Delandshere & Petrosky, 1994) . She disagrees with these assumptions and conceives of rating scales in performance assessment as "subjective" and indicating "levels of quality, from relatively poor to relatively good." We agree that ratings are supported by raters' personal judgments, hence they are subjective, and we find it peculiar that in this context quality needs to be represented by quantity. Brookhart's questioning of the "objectivity" and "correctness" assumption intrinsic to ratings appears to ignore the fact that a rating system is based on the belief that rating criteria can be applied uniformly and consistently by judges, and that once assigned these numbers become "objective" representations of interpreted complex performances. The "objectivity" of these numbers can be seen in the ways they are manipulated as if they had the same intrinsic properties and natural order as those of the positive real numbers. In an assessment system, numbers are averaged; they are compared to one another; they are used for computations to provide reliability indices; they serve as the basis to decide on a "passing score" and so on. This, we argue, is how complex performances are reduced to numbers of questionable meaning,--a process Brookhart does not seem to recognize--and rests on a belief in the mechanical objectivity of numbers. The numbers become "real" to those who use them, and a rating of three is thought to be better than a rating of two, even for instance, if judges themselves have difficulty distinguishing between performances that they characterize as "low 3" or "high 2." It is this process of implicit interpretation subsumed in a set of ratings that "objectify" the assessment. As Porter (1995) reminds us, "strict quantification, through measurement, counting, and calculation, is among the most credible strategies for rendering nature or society objective" (p. 74). In other words, quantification is a strategy that makes a process credible by giving it an allure of objectivity. And "quantitative estimates sometimes are given considerable weight even when nobody defends their validity with real conviction" (Porter, 1995, p. 8) . It is the credibility of the quantification strategy that we question and that we discuss as a validity issue for the assessment of complex performances.
Construct-Versus Task-Driven Assessment
On the issue of construct-versus task-driven assessment, we do not say that "since we are not referencing traits, we are not referencing constructs" as Brookhart claims we do. Rather, we acknowledge that "the constructs underlying these complex performances seem to be of a nature different from those that originally resulted from statistical analyses of test scores" (Delandshere & Petrosky, 1998, p. 19) . Brookhart seems to make a dualistic distinction between constructs and tasks as if the boundaries between these were clearly defined. But this distinction is not particularly clear or helpful and does not resolve the issues we address in our discussions of domain and sampling assumptions, the difficulty of defining the domain of generalization for complex performances, and the difficulty of inferring from scores in the absence of a well-defined universe of generaliz~!tion. Her distinction among "traits," "constructs, .... specific abilities," and "broad general abilities" is unclear and reflects the difficulty of defining the meaning of construct in the context of complex performances. The inclusion of context in defining the constructs, as she seems to propose, is discussed in our 1998 article where we extensively address the issue of generalizability. Referring to Kane's (1982) work, we counter-argue that "the context and specificity of the task could be defined as part of the measurement model ]hence the construct] and that context would be a fixed condition of the assessment, thereby restricting the universe of generalization" (Delandshere & Petrosky, 1998, p. 19) . The issue, however, is not resolved by including context in the description of the construct, since the more context and task specificity are included, the less generalizable performances become. But the main issue here is that this complex description--of the relationship of context, task, and construct--is hidden under construct labels such as "language arts teaching." Inferences are made from ratings to a generic construct that is implicitly-and ill-defined. Inferences about performances are more appropriately addressed, we think, by the warrants and descriptions included in interpretive summaries than by numerical ratings.
Brookhart's response establishes dualities and oppositions such as quantification versus no quantification, task versus construct, objective versus subjective, certification versus improvement of teaching, as if the issues they represent were easily resolvable. This is also visible when she objects to the qualitative distinction that we make between the process of interpretation and the process of recognition that judges engage in when asked to write interpretive summaries or when they are simply asked to provide a rating. We agree that recognizing a performance as belonging to a particular category requires interpretation. But when the only purpose is to assign a rating, the process of interpreta-tion is hidden, implicit, and unrecoverable. A process of recognition also works from a priori categories that may or may not be relevant to the particular performance being assessed. Indeed, when working from a priori categories the judges cannot take into account the teacher's own (and highly contextualized) interpretation of the assessment task. When judges are asked to articulate their interpretations explicitly, however, they become visible, open to scrutiny, and the validity of the inferences drawn from the performance can be examined.
In responding to our article Brookhart herself engages in a process of recognition rather than one of interpretation as she works from a priori categories presented as dichotomies (e.g., construct and task) that she does not recognize clearly in our work. She, however, does not articulate a rationale for preserving these oppositional categories. It is difficult to question a tradition from within because we are bound by the concepts and definitions of this tradition. Thus, from within the measurement tradition, it is difficult to question the use of scores and ratings because imagining an assessment system that is not grounded in measurement theory results in questioning the usefulness of the theory itself. Similarly, since measurement theory relies on the definition of constructs and domains, Brookhart does not recognize our questioning of "construct" as an acceptable critique, rather she categorizes us as advocates of task-driven assessment. This dualism makes it very difficult to consider alternative ways to think about assessment and to represent performances.
It is also.this kind of dualism that makes Brookhart conclude that although we addressed important questions, we took a "wrong turn." The very idea of "wrong" only exists if there is a correct response to a question. Her notion of correctness, however, stems from representing complex issues as simple, unidimensional problems. She states in her conclusion: "If assessment results are used for certification decisions, quantification poses no problem... If assessment results are used for describing good teaching and for advancing the field, description will also be required." Assessment, however, rarely has a single purpose. In the case of the NBPTS assessment, for instance, what would be the value of a certification system without the stated aims to represent good teaching and improve teaching practice?
